The missing half of mediation

The memorandum of understanding (MoU) between the United States and Iran, signed on June 17, briefly appeared to have achieved what weeks of military confrontation had not. It extended the ceasefire, reopened a path back to negotiations and offered the prospect of restoring stability to one of the world’s most strategically important regions.

The early indicators were encouraging. Commercial shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, which carries roughly a fifth of global oil trade, began to recover. Oil flows rose markedly, while Iranian exports more than doubled from their wartime low under a temporary sanctions waiver. About 340 commercial vessels passed through the Strait during the week of 22–28 June, making it the busiest period since hostilities began on February 28. For a brief moment, diplomacy appeared to be succeeding.

Within weeks, however, ships were disappearing from the strait again, military exchanges had resumed and mediators were seeking another temporary truce, simply to rescue the original agreement. What had looked like a diplomatic breakthrough rapidly became another fragile ceasefire. Its rapid unravelling exposed the missing half of the mediation process: the parties had agreed on a political text, but not on the mechanisms needed to implement it, while the states that brokered the agreement lacked the leverage to make it stick.

Part of the problem was that the signing of the agreement had been treated as the culmination of mediation rather than the beginning of its most demanding phase. The US and the mediators appear to have focused on securing a mutually acceptable political text. Success was measured by signatures and public declarations, with too little attention paid to the challenges that inevitably arise once governments, militaries, regulators, banks, insurers, shipping companies and regional allies begin to put an agreement into practice. Questions of interpretation, sequencing, verification, dispute resolution and confidence-building were largely deferred rather than resolved.

Like many ceasefire arrangements, the June MoU relied heavily on constructive ambiguity. This was understandable. Both Washington and Tehran needed sufficient political flexibility to present the agreement as a victory to domestic audiences while leaving difficult issues unresolved. Such ambiguity can allow diplomacy to move forward when complete agreement is impossible.

But ambiguity is useful only when clear mechanisms exist to manage what remains unresolved. Otherwise, disagreements simply migrate from the negotiating table into the implementation phase, where trust is lower and the political costs of failure are considerably higher. The MoU referred to maintaining a nuclear “status quo” without defining which activities were permitted or prohibited. It envisaged sanctions relief without specifying which restrictions would be suspended, under what legal authority or on what timetable. It also referred to frozen Iranian assets without establishing how those funds would be released, controlled or monitored. Public discussion suggested that approximately $12bn might eventually become available, yet disagreements quickly emerged over whether the funds would remain in supervised escrow accounts or come under unrestricted Iranian control.

The same weakness was evident in the maritime provisions. The agreement required Iran to “make arrangements using its best efforts for the safe passage of commercial vessels” and to engage in dialogue with the Sultanate of Oman to define the future administration and maritime services of the Strait of Hormuz “in line with applicable international law and the sovereign rights of the coastal states of the Strait of Hormuz”. Yet it established no agreed framework governing navigation, maritime security, inspection procedures, routing arrangements or dispute resolution. The language also allowed Tehran to interpret the agreement as recognising a future role in administering the strait.

Commercial traffic initially recovered because markets responded positively to the ceasefire announcement. Confidence, however, remained fragile because the institutional arrangements needed to sustain normal shipping had never been agreed. Although Washington committed to a temporary 60-day sanctions waiver covering limited oil sales, banking, insurance and shipping activities, many insurers, refiners and shipping companies remained cautious. A two-month legal window was simply too short to justify restoring long-term commercial relationships worth billions of dollars.

Iran undoubtedly benefitted from the respite. During the waiver period, it is estimated to have exported around 70 million barrels of oil, worth approximately $5bn–$6bn. Yet oil loaded onto tankers does not necessarily translate into unrestricted funds reaching Tehran. Uncertainty over sanctions, escrow arrangements and banking procedures prevented the commercial recovery from delivering the meaningful economic relief envisaged under the agreement.

The ceasefire also gave both sides time to prepare for the possibility that diplomacy might fail. The United States replenished military stocks and repositioned regional assets, while Iran used the pause to manage a delicate political transition and project continuity through the supreme leader’s funeral. Mediators hoped that time would generate political progress. Instead, both sides used it to strengthen their positions should negotiations collapse. The episode is a reminder that implementation is not merely an administrative exercise that follows successful diplomacy; it is diplomacy by other means. Every disagreement over sequencing, sanctions, verification, compliance or interpretation requires continued mediation if an agreement is to endure.

The MoU’s implementation failures were not merely the result of weak drafting. They reflected a deeper weakness in the mediation process: the states that secured the agreement had enough trust to bring the parties together, but not enough leverage to compel them to resolve disputes or honour their commitments once implementation began.

One encouraging development is that the mediation effort has broadened. What began largely as a Pakistani initiative has evolved into a wider diplomatic coalition, with Qatar, Egypt and other regional partners supporting efforts to restore the ceasefire and revive negotiations. This expansion spreads the considerable political, financial and logistical burden of mediation, broadens diplomatic access to regional stakeholders, including Israel, Hezbollah and others, and makes the process more resilient if any single channel becomes blocked.

Expansion alone, however, is unlikely to resolve the problem that has emerged. The additional mediators have much in common: they are trusted interlocutors with strong regional relationships, but they possess limited leverage over the strategic calculations of Washington and Tehran. They can facilitate dialogue, reduce misunderstandings and sustain negotiations. They cannot, by themselves, guarantee implementation.

The latest proposals illustrate the point. Mediators are discussing the reopening of an “Iran-approved” northern shipping route, currently affected by the US naval blockade, alongside a US-backed southern route where vessels have faced Iranian attacks. They are also considering possible arrangements for transit fees, either through a jointly managed fund or through a mechanism allowing Iran to collect charges linked to maritime security and environmental services. These arrangements may help revive the MoU, but on their own they are unlikely to secure a durable ceasefire, restore confidence in commercial shipping or sustain meaningful sanctions relief.

Sustainable implementation requires a different form of international support. As negotiations move from agreeing principles to enforcing obligations, stronger external guarantors become increasingly important. Major powers with significant economic, political and strategic influence can provide incentives, reassurance and, where necessary, pressure that smaller mediating states cannot readily mobilise. Their involvement need not replace the existing mediators, whose credibility and relationships remain indispensable. It should instead complement their efforts by providing the leverage needed to underpin implementation and reassure the parties that commitments will be reciprocated.

The challenge for the next phase of diplomacy is therefore not simply to broaden the circle of mediators, but to diversify its composition. Trusted regional mediators may be able to bring Washington and Tehran to the table. But without guarantors capable of underpinning implementation and imposing costs for non-compliance, any new agreement risks meeting the same fate as the June MoU: signed with optimism, briefly observed and rapidly undone.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.