Iran after Ayatollah Ali Khamenei

For years, interventionists in the West made the argument that the long-term costs of the political order in Iran, such as repression, economic decay, and social stagnation, outweighed the risks of a violent external regime change. Last month, the “moral barrier” to intervention was significantly lowered by the bloody crackdown on protests in January and the extensive positive coverage of the Iranian opposition in Western media.

The US-Israeli intervention came soon after, with both United States President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu urging Iranians to “rise up”. The assassinations of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and other high-level Iranian officials were celebrated as a major achievement.

However, the assumption that the removal of a central figurehead will lead to a “short and decisive rupture” followed by a smooth transition is far from certain. In fact, Iran after Ayatollah Khamenei may not be at all what the proponents of intervention desire to see.

Regime change gone wrong

The wider Middle East has three recent examples of why outside intervention is unlikely to result in a smooth transition and stability. Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya demonstrate that external military operations are followed not by rapid stabilisation, but by chaos. That much is apparent from a quick look at the scores of these countries on the Worldwide Governance Indicators of the World Bank.

Afghanistan experienced regime change in 2001 following the US invasion; that triggered two decades of fighting and attacks on civilians. In 2021, the country saw the return of the ousted regime, but stability remains elusive.

Iraq has seen various insurgencies and civil war following the US invasion in 2003; despite democratisation efforts, the country is still unable to return to pre-2003 stability.

Libya’s collapse following a NATO-led intervention in 2011 saw the country drop from positive stability scores in the Worldwide Governance Indicators to some of the lowest in the world, with no recovery in sight. The country remains split between two centres of governance – in Tripoli and Benghazi.

None of these countries have regained their pre-intervention stability levels. Their paths are marked by long-lasting fragility and volatility, rather than the “brief adjustment” promised by proponents of intervention.

Regime change that may not come

The regime in Iran is different in many ways from the ones that collapsed in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya. The assassination of leader Ayatollah Khamenei may have a profound impact that does not result in state collapse.

Within the symbolic universe of Shia Islam, to which the majority of Iranians belong, Khamenei’s death can be interpreted as the fulfillment of a martyrological script. Death at the hands of perceived enemies of Islam can be framed as redemptive passage rather than defeat; it is not a bitter collapse, as is the case with other Middle Eastern rulers who were ousted or killed. It is instead an idealised closure: the sacralisation of political life through sacrificial death.

This martyrological framing has the potential to rally a significant portion of the population, including those who were previously critical of the leadership, around a narrative of national defence. By transforming a fallen leader into a martyr of “foreign aggression”, the state can trigger a surge of nationalist cohesion and deep-seated resentment towards external intervention, potentially unifying the security forces and traditionalist sectors of society in a way that proponents of regime change did not anticipate.

This may be more challenging today due to the outcome of recent protests compared to the previous confrontation with Israel in June 2025. However, it remains a strong possibility.

It is also important to note that the experiences of Iraq, Libya, and Afghanistan indicate that the absence of intact bureaucratic, security, and fiscal institutions during external intervention can lead to prolonged instability.

For Iran, the big question now is whether administrative cohesion and territorial integrity can be preserved. Achieving this depends primarily on the survival of the “deep state”, the resilient civil bureaucracy and technocratic class that manages the country’s fiscal and essential services.

If the central bank, ministries, and regional governorates continue to function despite the leadership vacuum, the state may avoid the total “atomisation” seen in Libya. Furthermore, territorial integrity rests on the continued unity between the regular army (Artesh) and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

One major challenge would be finding a “national unifier” in the current climate. The bloody repression of the January protests has deeply fractured the relationship between the people and the political elite, making it difficult for any establishment figure to claim broad legitimacy. While a “technocratic-military council” led by figures with managerial backgrounds, such as Parliamentary Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, former President Hassan Rouhani or Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran Ali Larijani, might attempt to step in to provide a “security-first” stabilisation, they lack the spiritual authority of the late supreme leader.

In the absence of a figure who can bridge the chasm between the embittered street and the survival-driven security apparatus, any new leadership will likely struggle to project authority.

Instability after Khamenei

If institutional continuity fails or the army and the IRGC begin to compete, the risk of fragmentation and persistent conflict would increase. In this scenario, the violent rupture some call for today may mark the beginning of a structurally entrenched cycle of insecurity whose costs will be borne by Iranian society at large.

There are two factors that may shape such an outcome.

First is hollowing out of the middle class. Decades of Western sanctions have decimated the very social group that traditionally serves as a stabiliser during political transitions. Without a robust middle class, the political vacuum left behind by the ongoing war on Iran is more likely to be filled by armed factions or radicalised remnants of the current security apparatus.

These elements of the “ancien regime”, specifically hardline cadres within the IRGC and the Basij who perceive any new order as an existential threat to their lives and assets, are unlikely to disappear or “merge peacefully”, as the Trump administration appears to hope. Instead, they are more likely to transition from state actors to decentralised insurgent groups, using their deep knowledge of the country’s infrastructure to sabotage any attempt at a stable transition.

Second is social fragmentation. Iran possesses a level of ethnic and linguistic diversity greater than that of the average Middle Eastern country. In the absence of a central authority, and with security leadership currently targeted, the risk of state fragmentation and the rise of various militias should not be underestimated.

In worst-case scenario, internal turmoil is likely to follow the fault lines of existing grievances. In the borderlands, long-simmering insurgencies among the Baluch, Kurd and Arab populations could escalate into full-scale separatist conflicts as central control diminishes.

In major metropolitan centres, the collapse of a unified security chain may lead to localised upheaval, where rogue militias, acting without orders, compete for control over neighbourhood resources. Simultaneously, a violent “war of the elites” is inevitable, as the remaining military and political heavyweights would struggle to fill the vacuum of the leadership, potentially turning the state’s own institutions into battlefields of succession.

In recent weeks, the saying “a bitter ending is better than endless bitterness” has been invoked by some to justify foreign military intervention in Iran. Such perceptions seem to rest on the belief that a quick resolution can be achieved through military means.

However, as the data from Iraq, Libya, and Afghanistan confirm, war outcomes are not linear; they are catalysts for unpredictable and protracted deterioration. While the death of Ayatollah Khamenei marks a symbolic end to an era, history suggests that the “expected value” of such a violent rupture is often a path of chronic instability and institutional erosion rather than institutional renewal.

For the people of Iran, the “bitter ending” of a regime may not be the final act of their suffering, but the opening chapter of a new, structurally entrenched era of “endless bitterness” that could haunt the region for decades to come.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.